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Yet we all start from the same place. We relish the heat 
and redness of a fire, the sour tang of a lemon, the caress 
of a lover’s hand. Mystic or sceptic, we all agree that con-
sciousness is wonderful. Conscious sensations lie at the 
core of our being. Without them we’d be poorer creatures 
living in a duller world. What’s more we all agree that 
consciousness is inexplicable—or at any rate that it is at 
present unexplained. The problem is not that we do not 
understand consciousness at all. Some aspects of it are rela-
tively easy to account for in scientific terms. The problem 
is that one aspect continues to baffle everyone, and that’s 
the “qualitative feel of consciousness”: the redness of red, 
the painfulness of pain. The qualia—or, as people often 
express it, simply “what it’s like.”
The biologist H. Allen Orr probably speaks for the 
majority of scientists when, in a review of Thomas Nagel’s 
book “Mind and Cosmos,” he writes: “I share Nagel’s sense 
of mystery here. Brains and neurons obviously have every-
thing to do with consciousness but how such mere objects 
can give rise to the eerily different phenomenon of sub-
jective experience seems utterly incomprehensible” (Orr 
2013). Or, as Colin McGinn has colourfully put it: “The 
brain is just the wrong kind of thing to give birth to con-
sciousness. You might as well assert that numbers emerge 
from biscuits or ethics from rhubarb” (McGinn 1993).
Well, let’s see. I’ve called this paper “The Invention of 
Consciousness” because I want to play on two different 
meanings of the word “invention” in the English language.
An invention can be:
1. A device or process, developed by experiment, 
designed to fulfill a practical goal.
For example, a light-bulb or a telescope.
But alternatively, an invention can be:
Abstract In English we use the word “invention” in two 
ways. First, to mean a new device or process developed by 
experimentation, and designed to fulfill a practical goal. 
Second, to mean a mental fabrication, especially a false-
hood, designed to please or persuade. In this paper I argue 
that human consciousness is an invention in both respects. 
First, it is a cognitive faculty, evolved by natural selection, 
designed to help us make sense of ourselves and our sur-
roundings. But then, second, it is a fantasy, conjured up 
by the brain, designed to change the value we place on our 
existence.
Keywords Consciousness · Evolution · Qualia · 
Illusionism
The literary critic William Empson said of his own profes-
sion: “Critics are of two sorts: those who merely relieve 
themselves against the flower of beauty, and those, less 
continent, who afterwards scratch it up. I myself, I must 
confess, aspire to the second of these classes; unexplained 
beauty arouses an irritation in me” (Empson 1930). We 
could say that students of consciousness are of two sorts 
also. On the one hand, those who want to see the mystery 
left intact, well watered but otherwise untouched. On the 
other, those who see it as a scientific challenge, a natural 
phenomenon that we need to dig up and explain.
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2. A mental fabrication, especially a falsehood, designed 
to please or persuade.
For example, a fairy tale or a piano sonata.
I am going to argue that human consciousness is an 
“invention” in both these senses.
That’s to say, consciousness is:
1. A cognitive faculty, evolved by natural selection, 
designed to help us make sense of ourselves and our sur-
roundings.
But, on another level, consciousness is:
2.  A fantasy, conjured up by the brain, designed to 
change how we value our existence.
I’ll argue that qualia make little if any contribution to the 
cognitive faculty. However they lie at the very heart of the 
fantasy.
I must start, of course, by defining the scope of the 
term “consciousness”. People sometimes make a big meal 
of this. But I don’t think this first step need be controver-
sial—at any rate, not if we can ground it in the case we 
each know best subjectively, our own. If I may speak objec-
tively on your behalf, consciousness is surely just what you 
are conscious of: that’s to say the various states of mind of 
which at any one time you are the subject, and which are 
accessible to you by introspection.
It’s true that consciousness, defined this way, may be 
difficult to access in nonverbal animals. But fortunately 
grown-up human beings can indeed tell us about it (at least 
up to a point). And what all agree is that you can be con-
scious of a range of rather different kinds of mental state: 
perceptions, memories, wishes, thoughts, feelings, and so 
on. When you introspect, you observe these various states, 
as it were with an inner eye. So, it comes naturally to you—
and people everywhere do this—to think of consciousness 
as some kind of window on the mind, a private view of the 
stage where your mental life is being played out.
A view from whose standpoint? Well, from the stand-
point of whom else but “you”, your self. And this brings 
us immediately to one of the most striking features of con-
sciousness: its unity. There’s only one “you” at the win-
dow. Only one self. When you find yourself feeling pain, or 
wanting breakfast, or remembering your mother’s face, it’s 
the same you in each case.
We might think it obvious that it has to be so. But actu-
ally this unity is by no means a logical necessity. I’d say 
it’s quite conceivable—and indeed psychologically plausi-
ble—that your brain could house several independent yous, 
each representing a different segment of the mind. Indeed 
this fragmented state may have been the way you and every 
other human being started out at birth. Back then, and for 
the first few months of life, the different yous might hardly 
have known each other. Thankfully, however, it was never 
going to stay that way. As your life got going and your 
body—your one body—began interacting with the outside 
world, these separate selves were destined to come into reg-
ister—orchestrated, as it were, by the single line of music 
that, as it happened, made up your one life (Humphrey 
2000).
Was this “binding of selves” genetically pre-pro-
grammed? Not necessarily. I think it could have been the 
automatic outcome of the dynamics of mind and body. In 
fact, something like it can be seen occurring in quite sim-
ple physical systems. In the seventeenth century Christian 
Huygens, the inventor of the pendulum clock, made a sur-
prising observation. When two or more of his clocks were 
hung from the same beam, he noticed that their pendulums 
spontaneously began to beat in synchrony, showing as he 
put it an “odd kind of sympathy”. In a more recent demon-
stration, a set of five metronomes are placed on a floating 
table, and they too soon begin beating as one (Harvard Nat-
ural Sciences Demonstrations 2016). It happens because 
each individual metronome, interacting via the table, feels 
the pull of the others. In the case of consciousness, presum-
ably the story must be more complex. Yet perhaps not very 
much more complex. Perhaps the separate parts of a new-
born mind, interacting with a single body, also somehow 
feel the pull of the others.
Whatever the truth of this, let’s turn to the big question. 
Once your mental states all have the same subject, what 
does this unity achieve? The answer is a big one too. The 
unity of consciousness underwrites the most obvious cog-
nitive function of consciousness, which is to create what 
Marvin Minsky has called the “society of mind” (Minsky 
1986). Just as—in fact just because—there is only one 
“you” at the window, there comes to be only one mind 
on the other side. Information from different agencies is 
being brought to the same table, as it were, and it’s here 
that your sub-selves can meet up, shake hands and engage 
in fertile cross-talk. This means you now have a mind-wide 
forum for planning and decision making. And the way is 
then open for a central processing unit to take control: an 
intelligent agent that can recognise patterns, marry past 
and future, assign priorities and so on across the mind as 
a whole. A computer engineer might recognise this as an 
“expert system”. You of course recognise it as “I”.
But, alongside this, another opportunity emerges. Once 
you can observe the parts of the mind interacting on a sin-
gle stage, you are in a position to make sense of the interac-
tion. And this can support a second important function of 
consciousness: namely, to allow you to appreciate just how 
your mind works. Observing, for example, how “beliefs” 
and “desires” generate “wishes” that lead to “actions”, 
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you find your mind revealed as having a clear psychologi-
cal structure. Thus you begin to gain insight into why you 
think and act the way you do. This means you can explain 
yourself to yourself, and explain yourself to other people 
too. But, equally important, it means you have a model 
for explaining other people to yourself. When you meet 
another person, you can assume his mind works much as 
yours does. So you can work out what he is likely to be 
thinking and how he will behave. Consciousness has laid 
the ground for what psychologists call “Theory of Mind.”
So far, so good. We have a workable definition of con-
sciousness in terms of introspection. And we’ve identified 
two ways in which introspection can be put to practical 
use. So that’s two reasons why this kind of consciousness 
would have been likely to be selected in the course of evo-
lution. What’s more we have a plausible metaphor for how 
it works: consciousness provides a window onto—and at 
the same time creates—the society of mind.
Yet, what about the imagery I’m using here? Doesn’t 
it smack of the “Cartesian theatre” on which Dan Dennett 
(1991) has poured such scorn? No, I think that’s a false 
worry. What Dennett has objected to is the idea that the 
brain contains a projection space where a replica of the 
outside world is on show to an inner observer. But I hope 
it’s clear this is not what’s being proposed. What the win-
dow of consciousness opens onto is a picture not of what’s 
outside but of what’s inside—the mental states whose turns 
and twists and conflicts underlie the way you think and act. 
If this is theatre, it is indeed more like a proper human the-
atre, where a play is running.
Imagine yourself at a performance of a Shakespeare 
play. Shakespeare was not concerned with copying reality. 
His plays are stories, dramatic mock-ups, designed to ana-
lyse, expose and explain. And indeed as he himself made 
plain, the stories rely on codes and shorthand. In a famous 
prologue to Henry V, the Chorus apologises on behalf of 
the actors—mere ciphers or symbols—for daring to rec-
reate the pageant of history on stage. “Pardon,” the Cho-
rus says, “The flat unraised spirits that have dared on this 
unworthy scaffold to bring forth so great an object: Can 
this cockpit hold the vasty fields of France?” The secret, he 
continues, lies in the encryption. Just as a string of zeros 
can represent a huge number—“Since a crooked figure may 
attest in little place a million”—so the players and props 
on stage can represent a reality of quite a different order. 
“So let us, ciphers to this great account, on your imaginary 
forces work.”
It’s a startlingly prescient passage—almost as if Shake-
speare has anticipated modern ideas about how mental 
states are represented in the brain. But, with his words in 
front of us, I want to take up another remarkable allusion: 
“Can this cockpit hold the vasty fields of France?”
The term “cockpit” originated of course as the name of 
an arena for staging cock-fights. Already, by Shakespeare’s 
time, it had morphed into the name for any confined space 
where important things get done. He could not have known 
that the word cockpit would later come to mean the wheel-
room of a ship and later still the control room of an aero-
plane. Yet, now, when we’re discussing consciousness, I 
want to suggest the cockpit of a plane provides an even bet-
ter analogy for consciousness than the theatrical stage does.
So picture, if you will, the cockpit of a plane. And place 
yourself where the pilot sits. You’ll see before you an array 
of instrument panels, that display the output of a variety 
of modules that are monitoring the plane’s external and 
internal states: speed, altitude, fuel reserves, global posi-
tion, intended course, and so on. Let’s say then that, from 
your privileged seat, you have a window on the plane’s 
beliefs, desires, and intentions—presented in coded form, 
of course, as numbers, icons, graphs. Your job as pilot is to 
integrate all this information, so as to decide what to do to 
achieve certain goals. You must observe, then think, then 
act. You have a joystick with which you can control the 
plane’s wing flaps and tail fin, so as to steer the plane in 
the intended direction. Oh, and by the way, you also have a 
cockpit radio, so you can report verbally to ground control. 
You have become in effect the plane’s self.
You’ll appreciate the analogy. And yet, you may be won-
dering what the point is. A conscious human pilot as an 
analogy for a conscious agent in the brain? If there’s con-
sciousness on both sides of the equation, where does that 
get us? But that’s just it. It doesn’t have to be on both sides. 
I want to use the analogy as a further way of demystifying 
consciousness.
We already know for a fact that there’s no need to have 
a conscious agent in the pilot’s seat. An electronic auto-
pilot, made of nothing but circuit boards, can—and in 
many planes does—fulfill exactly the same function as the 
pilot, collating information, referencing a knowledge base, 
choosing the best path, and so on. The autopilot can even 
be designed to report on what it’s doing and why, to a base 
on the ground, in simulated speech if required. And it can 
keep a historical record of its own activity (tucked away 
in a black box so that it can be accessed posthumously if 
necessary).
True, no one has yet engineered a plane’s autopilot to 
be capable of reading the minds of other planes. But as it 
happens just such meta-cognitive abilities are already being 
incorporated into the computers of driverless cars. To navi-
gate traffic safely, the computer must be able to anticipate 
how other cars are likely to behave. The computer has to 
have, in effect, a “Theory of Drivers”. How does it learn 
this theory? I don’t know the facts here, but I wouldn’t be 
surprised if engineers are already working on having one 
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computer learn how to model other computers by reflecting 
on its own example.
So, back to the problem of consciousness. My point of 
course is that if an electronic autopilot can be engineered 
to do all this, then it’s not so surprising that a brain can. 
We’re talking normal science and engineering here. In fact 
the science is well under way. To mention a few areas of 
good progress: Stanislas Dehaene (2014) has been mapping 
what he calls “the global neuronal workspace”; Giulio Ton-
oni (2012) has proposed a statistical model of “integrated 
information”; Christof Koch and Francis Crick (2005) have 
identified a brain structure, the claustrum, as a potential 
candidate for the master of ceremonies.
I suggested at the start that consciousness is an invention 
in the first sense of the term: “A cognitive faculty, evolved 
by natural selection, designed to help us make sense of our-
selves and our surroundings”. Exactly. So far it seems this 
is just what consciousness is. And, as I suggested would 
be the case, we haven’t yet had to say anything about the 
mysterious feel. We get this cognitive faculty—the work-
space, the integration, the theory of mind—without having 
so much as to mention the eeriness of consciousness.
This is good news, in its way. But bad news too. The 
good news is that we’re getting an account of conscious-
ness that looks like being scientifically respectable. The 
bad news is we’re getting an account of consciousness that 
leaves out the very thing that many of us think of as its 
most baffling and intriguing feature. What about the eery 
phenomenal feel of consciousness? Where’s the “what it’s 
like” that everyone beefs about?
We defined consciousness at the outset as comprising 
all those mental states that are available to introspection. 
But now, if we want to make the eeriness of consciousness 
the issue, we’ll have to focus in. Does the quality in ques-
tion pervade all mental states? No, that’s the thing: it does 
not seem to be a feature of higher-level cognitive states. At 
any rate it’s not a necessary feature. There is no special feel 
associated with your having the thought, say, that today is 
Thursday. It’s not like anything for you to believe it’s going 
to rain, or to remember where you put your hat.
Rather, it seems the phenomenal quality kicks in only 
at a more animal level. It’s there especially, perhaps exclu-
sively, in the way you represent what’s happening at your 
bodily sense organs––skin, eyes, nose, ears, tongue. It’s 
there—and it’s only there—with your experience of sensa-
tions: the pain of a bee sting, the salt taste of an anchovy, 
the blue look of the sky. Among conscious mental states, 
sensations have the very special property of being intrinsi-
cally eery, they simply couldn’t be the states they are with-
out having this mysterious dimension to them.
As I said at the opening, sensations lie at the heart of 
our being. No one would or could wish qualia out of exist-
ence. Indeed there will have been times for all of us when 
conscious experience is about little else. A science of con-
sciousness that leaves qualia out is not just ignoring the 
elephant in the room, it is ignoring the elephant that is the 
room. Yet so far it seems that this is all the science we’re 
getting. How can that be?
There may be several explanations for why qualia are 
not been given the priority we might expect. No doubt it’s 
partly because, as we have just seen, cognitive science can 
indeed go a long way towards explaining consciousness 
without any reference to them. But it’s also because of the 
fear, expressed by a good many scientists—and philoso-
phers too—that it will never be possible to explain qualia in 
conventional scientific terms. H. Allen Orr, as we saw, said 
that qualia are “utterly incomprehensible”. Christof Koch 
wrote to me not long ago: “it is bizarre that brain matter 
should exude these phenomenal feelings. Consciousness is 
so vivid, and its properties appear so otherworldly, that it 
seems to call for God”. Koch may have been half-joking. 
But who’s laughing? Short of invoking some supernatural 
agency, where are we to go?
There are indeed a good many theorists who simply 
don’t want to go anywhere with it. It’s not so much a case 
of qualia denial—though that exists too—as qualia avoid-
ance. Isaac Newton set the tone 500  years ago: “But, to 
determine more absolutely, what light is, after what man-
ner refracted, and by what modes or actions it produceth in 
our minds the Phantasms of Colours, is not so easie. And 
I shall not mingle conjectures with certainties” (Newton 
1671). Jerry Fodor has echoed Newton’s pessimism: “We 
don’t know, even to a first glimmer, how a brain (or any-
thing else that is physical) could manage to be a locus of 
phenomenal experience. This is, surely, among the ultimate 
metaphysical mysteries; don’t bet on anybody ever solving 
it” (Fodor 1998).
Of course not everyone has been so ready to surren-
der. In the coffee room, if not yet the lab, there has been 
ongoing debate about just what kind of thing qualia are 
and what to do about them. The answers that have been 
proposed have not always been helpful. Yet it does seem 
a consensus is emerging, at least about the boundaries of 
the problem. Most theorists now accept that there are only 
two options that can be taken seriously. We can be Realists 
about qualia, or else we have to be Illusionists (Frankish 
2016).
The names make the meaning of these alternatives 
clear. Realists take qualia at face value. In their view, if 
your sensations appear to have qualities that lie beyond 
the scope of physical explanation, then it must be they 
really do have such qualities. And this is possible because 
the brain activity that underlies sensations already has 
consciousness latent in it as an additional property of 
matter—a property as yet unrecognised by physics, but 
one that you the conscious subject are somehow able to 
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tap into. Tom Nagel, for example, writes: “The exist-
ence of consciousness seems to imply that the physical 
description of the universe, in spite of its richness and 
explanatory power, is only part of the truth, and that the 
natural order is far less austere than it would be if physics 
and chemistry accounted for everything” (Nagel 2012). 
So, according to the Realists, when you experience pain, 
say, you are in effect breaking through the veil of mun-
dane physics to access a higher-order realm.
Illusionists, by contrast, will have none of this. They 
argue that if your sensations appear to have these marvel-
lous non-physical properties, then this can only be because 
your physical brain is playing tricks on you. And this is 
possible because the brain is a computational engine that 
deals in symbols, and physically based symbols can per-
fectly well represent states of affairs that do not and even 
could not exist (thank you, Shakespeare!). Dan Dennett, 
for example, has it that: “Consciousness is an illusion of 
the brain, for the brain, by the brain.” Qualia are like “a 
beautiful discussion of purple, just about a colour, without 
itself being coloured” (Dennett 1991, p. 371). So, accord-
ing to Illusionists, when you have a sensation—of purple, 
or sweetness, or pain—you are accessing your own brain’s 
magic show and being tricked into believing you have 
reached through to another level of reality, when in fact it’s 
all coming from your side.
Realism and Illusionism. The trouble is that both these 
theoretical positions come at a considerable price. On 
the one hand, the price of Realism is that it implies that 
the standard physical description of the world is radically 
incomplete. Some people actually welcome this. Nagel 
thinks it would make the natural order less austere! But oth-
ers—including me—find it a lazy and inelegant solution.
But then, on the other hand, there’s a price to illusionism 
too. Illusionism undermines—and in many people’s eyes 
devalues—the mystery of human experience. Some people 
welcome that too. Dennett clearly takes wicked delight, in 
discomforting what he calls the Mysterians. He’s happy to 
be, as he puts it, “the cop at Woodstock” (the policeman 
at a pop festival). But many others find illusionism deeply 
depressing, complaining that it “unweaves the rainbow” 
and so on.
Still, which is right? No one yet knows for sure. But I’m 
not hiding which I hope is right. Although I myself have 
recently questioned the language of illusionism (Humphrey 
2016b), I hope to see a resolution of the “hard problem” 
within the bounds of our standard world model.
Here’s an appealing analogy. I expect you are familiar 
with the “real impossible triangle”, or “Gregundrum”, a 
wooden object invented by Richard Gregory which, when 
looked at from one particular viewpoint, looks exactly like 
a solid Penrose triangle—a structure that simply couldn’t 
exist in the physical world. My suggestion—my hope—is 
that the apparent “unreality” of consciousness comes down 
to a similar trick of perspective.
Can we do better than merely hope for this? Does any-
one have any idea about what kind of physical processes 
in the brain might possibly underlie it? Actually yes, as 
I’ll explain in a moment, I think—contrary to Fodor—we 
do have at least “a first glimmer”. But before going there I 
want to consider a much simpler example. When sceptics 
are questioning whether any scientific theory can deliver 
the semi-magical effects, it will be good if we can point to 
a model mechanism that can emulate some of these effects. 
Then, at least we’ll have a proof of principle.
So let’s go back to my cockpit analogy. And let’s sup-
pose now that the plane you are flying has specialised sen-
sors in its body, analogous to human sense organs, whose 
job is to represent what’s happening at its body surface—
heat, pressure, tissue damage and so on. Let’s suppose, too, 
that there is a special set of “sensory instruments” in the 
cockpit, which display this information. But here’s what’s 
special: while all the other instruments on the panel use 
simple flat graphical or numerical displays, the sensory 
instruments—and only the sensory instruments—dress 
them up in a very special way: as holograms.
We’ve all seen holograms. The picture appears to rise 
above the flat surface. Of course we know it’s not real. It 
only looks as if there’s a third dimension. However, you, 
in the magical cockpit don’t know this. To you it seems 
that the numbers really are jumping out of the screen. No 
wonder, then, that you find these sensory displays spe-
cially attention-grabbing and impressive. You do your best 
to explain to others, over the radio, just what it’s like. But 
sadly, words often fail you. Still, it is your own first-person 
experience that matters to you above all. From now on you 
will go flying just to immerse yourself in these extraordi-
nary displays. As Lord Byron said: The great object of life 
becomes sensation—“to feel that we exist, even though in 
pain” (Byron 1813).
But I must not get carried away, just because you the 
pilot have been. I’m running ahead of my own argument.
OK. An analogy is an analogy. A hologram is a holo-
gram. What can this actually have to do with the brain and 
qualia? Well, dare I say it, maybe it’s not just an analogy. I 
want to draw your attention to the so-called “holographic 
principle” which has come out of cosmology and the phys-
ics of black holes. The principle states that, not only can 
a three-dimensional world always be represented without 
loss of information by a two-dimensional surface (as in a 
conventional hologram), but an n-dimensional world can 
always be represented by a (n − 1) dimensional surface.
Thus, to start with, when three-dimensional objects dis-
appear into black holes, the information they contain need 
not have been finally lost—which would be problematic 
for physics—but instead could be preserved on the hole’s 
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two-dimensional surface, from which an illusion of the 
original objects could be regenerated. In fact, in light of 
this, cosmologists have suggested that the three-dimen-
sional world we ourselves believe we inhabit could actually 
be just such an illusion arising from a flat two-dimensional 
surface. But more to the point, we can now suggest that 
the four-dimensional world of conscious qualia could quite 
well be an illusion generated by a three-dimensional brain. 
As someone said about the black hole case: “This idea is so 
odd, it’s comparable to finding that the instruction manual 
for a dishwasher holds the recipe to making a good choco-
late soufflé” (Maynard 2015). Ah ha! As someone else said 
about consciousness: “You might as well assert that num-
bers emerge from biscuits or ethics from rhubarb”(McGinn 
1993). Looks as though we might be on to something!
Yes, but how precisely could it work? As it happens, 
Karl Pribram, back in the 1970s, did indeed raise the pos-
sibility that information in the brain is stored in holograms. 
But no one today takes Pribram’s detailed model seriously. 
So how else might the brain be generating a higher-dimen-
sional sensory display? I’ve been working on an answer to 
this question for many years (Humphrey 1992, 2006, 2011). 
I’ve wanted an answer that takes account of evolutionary 
history. This isn’t the place to give you the full story, but 
I’ll try to give a brief overview.
It begins, as I see it, with the creatures that were our 
far distant ancestors, floating in the seas, making evalua-
tive responses to stimuli at the body surface: “wriggles of 
acceptance or rejection”. These responses, to which I’ve 
given the general name “sentition”, have been honed by 
natural selection, so as to be well adapted to the creature’s 
needs—taking account of what kind of stimulus is reach-
ing the body surface, what part of the body is affected, and 
what import this has for biological well-being. From the 
start then, the responses can be said to be meaningful—
which is to say they potentially carry a lot of information 
about what the stimulation means for the creature. How-
ever, to begin with, there is no one at home in the brain 
to realise this potential, no one to take an interest in the 
meaning.
But, evolution is inventive. Before long there arises 
in the brain a special module—a proto self, if you like—
whose job is exactly that: to discover “what the stimulation 
means for me”. And, as luck would have it, it turns out it 
can do this by the simple trick of reading—extracting the 
meaning from—the motor command signals being sent out 
to produce the reflex response.
So now, we have an agent who is reading the brain’s own 
responses and making a sensory interpretation of them. 
In truth this is the first subject of sensation. But let’s note 
there is nothing fancy or magical about the interpretation at 
this stage. The subjective experience does not have had any 
special phenomenal feel. What happened?
I’ve argued that the key lay in how sentition went on 
evolving. Back at the start, the reflex responses are overt 
bodily actions occurring at the site of stimulation at the 
body surface. However things are never going to stay like 
this. As the descendants of the original creatures evolve to 
be more sophisticated, these overt responses soon enough 
become inappropriate, even inconvenient—you don’t 
always want to grimace when you’re touched by red light, 
say. So now the creature faces a problem. How to lose the 
bodily behaviour but keep the information about the mean-
ing of the stimulus?
The solution natural selection hits on is ingenious. It is 
for the responses to become internalised, or “privatised”, 
such that the motor signals no longer reach the actual body 
surface, but rather begin to target the body-map where 
the sense organs first project to the brain. Thus sentition 
evolves from being an actual form of bodily expression to 
being a virtual one—yet still a response that the subject can 
milk for information.
Now, this privatisation has a remarkable—if for-
tuitous—result. It means that a feedback loop is created 
between motor and sensory regions of the brain—a loop 
that has the capacity to sustain recursive activity, going 
round and round, catching its own tail. And this, as I see it, 
is game-changing. Crucially, it means that the activity can 
be drawn out in time, so as to create the “thick moment” of 
sensory experience. But, more than this, the activity can be 
channelled and stabilised, so as to create a mathematically 
complex “attractor” state. And such an attractor can have 
remarkable hyper-dimensional properties (Krisztin 2008). 
Real, unreal, surreal? The answer will be in the eye of the 
beholder—the subject whose reading of this brain activity 
is giving rise to the sensory experience.
At any rate, from now on, whenever the opportunity 
arises to “improve” the quality of sensations—to make fur-
ther adaptive changes—natural selection has a whole new 
design space to explore. Small adjustments to the circuitry 
can have dramatic effects. And this provides the evolution-
ary context, I believe, for the invention of a special kind of 
attractor that will be read by the subject as a sensation with 
an unaccountable phenomenal feel. On the analogy of the 
Gregundrum, I’ve called this attractor the “ipsundrum”, to 
signify a real “impossible brain state” that is actually self 
made. The ipsundrum is still a species of sentition, that 
originates as a response to sensory stimulation, and still 
carries information about the objective properties of the 
stimulation. But this information now comes in a remark-
able new guise. It comes, if you like, as part of “a riddle 
written on the brain” (Humphrey 2016a).
I put forward this account of sensations more than 
25 years ago. My arguments were largely theoretical, rather 
than empirical. But I’m happy to say it looks as if one of 
the key features has been getting experimental backing: 
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namely that visual sensations depend on brain activity in a 
loop running between primary visual cortex and areas fur-
ther forward. In a masterly review of recent neuroscientific 
evidence, Stan Dehaene (who, oddly enough, is something 
of a “qualia denier”) sums up the picture he sees emerging: 
“Consciousness lives in the loops: reverberating neuronal 
activity, circulating in the web of our cortical connections, 
causes our conscious experiences” (Dehaene 2014, p. 156).
So there we have it: my glimmer of a theory of what 
gives consciousness its astonishing quality. With so much 
of the detail missing, I acknowledge it’s not much more 
than a glimmer. But it must be better than no theory at all. 
Colin McGinn has written: “It is not that we know what 
would explain consciousness but are having trouble find-
ing the evidence to select one explanation over the others; 
rather, we have no idea what an explanation of conscious-
ness would even look like” (McGinn 1999, p. 61.) I humbly 
suggest that’s no longer true.
This is all I have to say for now about how a physical 
system could deliver conscious experience. However, for 
an evolutionist, of course it’s too soon to wrap up the dis-
cussion. We may have found a possible answer to the ques-
tion of what evolved, but we haven’t yet begun to address 
the question of why it evolved. Even if we did know all 
the detail—if we could explain how conscious experience 
is created neuron by neuron, from red light touching your 
retina through to your making all the claims you do about 
the red qualia—we still would not know what this is good 
for. What can possibly have been the biological advantage, 
the contribution to fitness, of dressing up sensations in this 
provocatively mysterious way?
It’s a real problem. Let’s return to the idea of conscious-
ness as an invention. Under the first meaning of invention 
we saw that consciousness could indeed be considered to be 
“a cognitive faculty, evolved by natural selection, designed 
to help us make sense of ourselves and our surroundings.” 
But now, when we consider the role of qualia, this meaning 
of invention looks much less of a good fit. At first sight at 
least, qualia are neither cognitive, nor helpful!
Jerry Fodor has stated the difficulty in his typically blunt 
way: “Consciousness”—and it’s clear he’s referring to 
qualia in particular—“seems to be among the chronically 
unemployed. As far as anybody knows, anything that our 
conscious minds can do they could do just as well if they 
weren’t conscious. Why then did God bother to make con-
sciousness?” (Fodor 2004). John Searle has made much the 
same claim, about qualia having no impact at the level of 
behaviour: “As far as the ontology of consciousness is con-
cerned, behaviour is simply irrelevant. We could have iden-
tical behaviour in two different systems, one of which is 
conscious and the other totally unconscious” (Searle 1992).
If these philosophers are right, it would mean that con-
sciousness—at least its phenomenal side—could not have 
had any impact on our ancestors’ survival. In which case 
the genes specifying the underlying brain circuits could 
not have been selected by natural selection.
Then, are these philosophers right? I think the plain 
answer is, No. They are guilty of a massive failure of 
imagination.
Fodor says qualia are “unemployed”. He seems to take 
it for granted that, if consciousness does have a job to do, 
this can only be to provide us with some special kind of 
skill—helping us to act more intelligently or more effi-
ciently in the service of some practical goal. But what 
if this notion of employment is simply not appropriate 
when discussing the phenomenal aspect of conscious-
ness? What if phenomenal consciousness, rather than 
making us more intelligent or more productive on the 
outside, makes us somehow bigger on the inside—emo-
tionally and spiritually bigger? What if consciousness is 
actually an invention in the second sense I mentioned at 
the start: “a fantasy, conjured up by the brain, designed to 
change how we value what becomes of us?”
Think about it. Think again about the real impossible tri-
angle, the Gregundrum. Why, for what purpose, did Rich-
ard Gregory invent this brilliant illusion? It surely wasn’t to 
serve any practical purpose. There’s a photo showing him 
with his face framed by the real impossible object (Greg-
ory 2011). Look at his broad smile. He did it simply to 
amaze us. Then, could it be that Nature, when she invented 
qualia, did it so that we conscious creatures should amaze 
ourselves?
Don’t get me wrong. I am a card-carrying Darwinian 
reductionist. I’ve no wish to get off the explanatory hook 
by substituting fuzzy answers for clear ones. But still, I 
do think there are times when, in the interests of science, 
we need to loosen up a bit. Before we pronounce on the 
employability of phenomenal consciousness, we need to 
undertake a proper natural history. We should be studying 
how conscious experience actually changes the way people 
live in the world. How does exposure to qualia change peo-
ple’s psychology? What beliefs and attitudes are generated? 
How does it affect people’s ideas about who and what they 
are, and what kind of world they live in?
These are—or ought to be—empirical questions to be 
asked of ordinary people. And we should be ready to con-
sider all sorts of possible answers, not just those we’d find 
discussed in the science or philosophy section of the library 
but perhaps those that belong in the self-help section, or 
even the New Age. But, most important, we should begin 
the inquiry close to home, by taking seriously our own 
intuitions about just how and why phenomenal conscious-
ness matters to ourselves.
Think about it. Suppose the magic for you were not 
there. Suppose your sensations were in fact just brown bag 
numbers. What would be missing from your life?
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It’s clear to me that in such a semi-zombie state I—
you—would lose out, on several levels. First, you’d lose 
your psychological essence, your core self. Next, you’d lose 
your sense of intimacy with things in the outside world. 
And then, finally, you’d lose your soul, and other humans 
would lose their souls as well.
1  Self
We saw, early on, how the binding of sub-selves leads to 
the creation of the core self as the singular subject of a 
range of mental states. But, now let me say it, even when all 
the sub-selves are gathered together, the larger self is by no 
means secure. A self stripped of sensations would remain 
a pretty anaemic kind of self. But add in the qualia, and 
everything changes. By lifting sensory experience onto that 
mysterious, non-physical plane, qualia deepen and enrich 
your sense of your own presence. You find yourself living 
in thick time. You become the owner of a self that you want 
to expand and preserve for its own sake—in short, a self 
worth having. Take away this primary sense of your own 
presence, and your existence would simply be less well-
founded, less convincing—to you and everyone else.
2  World
Next, though this isn’t so obvious, you’d lose the external 
world—at least the world as you’ve come to know and love 
it. Even though it’s your own brain that creates the qualia, 
you can’t but project the special qualities of sensations 
out onto the objects of perception in the outside world. In 
doing so, you spread a kind of fairy-dust around you. You 
enchant the world. Take away this magic paintbrush, and 
the world would lose much of its significance. You’d find it 
a less awesome place, less fun, less promising.
3  Soul
You did it. It’s all yours. The things out there, experienced 
through bodily sensation, are singing your song. It’s bound 
to dawn on you that when you pay homage to the beauties 
of nature you are really paying homage to yourself. So, by 
a strange inversion, the magical world you’ve made returns 
the compliment and further enhances your sense of your 
own significance. Then add in the poetry of human culture, 
and by one path or another, your core self becomes elabo-
rated into that marvellous cultural construct: the human 
soul. A soul that, with your generous theory of mind, you 
recognise in other people too.
Now, I will draw this to a close. Earlier, when I quoted 
Shakespeare’s prologue, I omitted the first lines. They read.
 
O for a Muse of fire, that would ascend.
The brightest heaven of invention.
The chorus means “invention” in the second sense: he’s 
seeking permission for the actors to create an extraordi-
nary work of fiction on the stage. I like to think that Nature 
did it first. Qualia are just such an invention, arguably the 
brightest heaven—the most remarkable story that anyone 
has ever dared to tell. Thanks to natural selection, we all 
contain within ourselves that muse of fire.
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